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THE GLA MORA MA AS WORLD MODEL 
'God is dead.' (Nietzsche) 
'Nietzsche is dead ' (God) 
'Both of them are dead.' (Odin) 
(graffiti) 
Hungarian criticism primarily approaches Bret Easton Ellis's novel, 
Glamoramd from particular theoretical problems. These are prominently the 
problem of the reality-effects (the necessity and impossibility of a referential- or 
mimetic-principled reading) and the questions of the textual apprehensibility of 
popular culture (filmic narration, surficiality, subcultural embeddedness, etc.) 
Although these approaches lead the reader to recognitions which are revealing in 
a considerable number of cases, they provide few clues concerning the text's 
readability as a novel. They above all deal with the details and, indeed, with the 
surficial aspects of the text. Rather, it appears to me that an allegorically 
organised, coherent system of narrative and metaforic patterns run along the 
text; the interpretation of which, not least, confronts us precisely with that 
theoretical possibility that the distinguishability of surface and depth cannot only 
be admitted as an illusion; or can, but not in the sense as the criticism of 
logocentrism traditionally conceives it. In my paper, I undertake the task of 
interpreting the novel by the comparison of these patterns while also looking for 
the answer how this attitude of the text in relation to signification can be 
apprehended. 
The central theme of the text is conspiracy. Therefore, my first question is 
what in fact conspiracy is as such. It is a complex structure, formed by an 
undefined number of elements, in which each element of the system is attached 
to at least one other, and the map of the links is arborescent, amorphous. 
Regarding the interplay of the elements, every system element is moved except 
for one, and several elements are movers as well. Nevertheless, one element is 
exclusively a mover, i.e. the system contains one (and solely one) unmoved 
1 Bret Easton Ellis: Glamorama (1st ed.) (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1999). All 
references are to and all quotations are extracted from this edition. The page numbers of 
the referred to or quoted parts appear in brackets after each reference or quotation in the 
text of the paper. 
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centre. The operation of the system is governed by some kind of law which 
determines, on the one hand, the rules by which particular elements are joined, 
and on the other, the rules by which the elements move.2 This principle is 
unknown in every case just as the whole of the structure organised by it. As the 
object of cognition, the conspiracy becomes a secret, and as a secret waiting for 
disclosing, it can be divided into two levels. The surface level is composed of 
systematically recurring motifs, changes, movements which are related to single 
system elements, and which can be structured according to the aspect of identity 
and difference and interpreted as signs (symptoms). On the second level, reason, 
motivation, principle stands, which as a signified can at least be assumed and 
recognised in principle (i.e. it can be detected). 
This system corresponds to the linguistic model of the metaphysics of 
presence and to its epistemological fundamental, having its base on this very 
linguistic model, which itself is based on the separability and superposability of 
the sign and the signified, on the subordination of the sign, and on the principle 
of representation (i.e. the system corresponds to the aspiration by which the 
metaphysics of presence strives to map out the referential world relying on the 
help of causality). In this perspective, as the objects of experience, every 
phenomenon and thing fits into the same network of an unknown system, where 
they play or can play the roles of the mover and the moved at the same time. 
The purpose of cognition is to reach that fixed point which is the ultimate reason 
of every movement, which is the unmoved itself by exploring the movement and 
the net of links (the meaning and the sense) of particular elements. The 
significance of cognition accordingly lies in the fact whether the explored net 
could really be closed or not, i.e. whether it is complete or not. In other words, 
in the fact how many elements and how exclusively they are attached to the 
known reason (the mover). 
Consequently, we can rigtly expect that the novel is going to tell us about 
how the characters are connected to the conspiracy. The relevant attribute of the 
characters will be their position in relation to cognition, and the plot will take 
shape through the transition of this attribute. According to our first assumption, 
the conspiracy, despite of all its obscurity and complications, is a local one. 
Therefore, we would await reading a detective story, learning about the 
operation of a confinable, circumscribable (a politically and/or socially 
subversive) system. Our impression is that the bounds of the conspiracy show 
congruence with the frames of Victor's life. The sequence of oblique hints and 
motifs leads us to the suspicion that the key figure of the conspiracy is the 
father, and his aim is to replace Victor with an alter ego. (Lunch with the father, 
2 Cf. the description of the system with Aristotle's Metaphysics (XII. 6-7, especially 6, 
1071b 4). 
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the critique of Victor's lifestyle, the necessity of a "new you" [79], the 
problematics of replacement, the insufficiency of the change of the name [77-
82].) Considering all what have just been elaborated above, what in fact can this 
text be about? 
Joining the problematics of genealogy and representation in the relation of 
the strong father versus the weak son could in principle become interpretable 
according to the semiotic scheme of fallogocentrism. The assigning of a name as 
a cultural creative gesture is supposed to provide opportunity for the existence 
and (self-)representation of the father (and of the ultimate substance at the end 
of the invisible genealogy chain). The metaforic attachment of the offspring (the 
signifier) and the begetter (the signified) through the identical name would 
create the unity and exclusiveness of genealogy (meaning). However, the 
conspiracy, which seems to be ruled by the father, is precisely working on the 
metaforic replacement of an offspring who represents the father imperfectly. In 
this sense, Victor is a bad trope because in his case, two things showing no 
similarity have been denominated by the same word (name). On the other hand, 
his alter ego is a trope which represents well because in its case, the same word 
(name3) refers to a similar entity. So, the correlation of meaning is assured; 
moreover, it is necessary; actually this is what happens. The two possible agents 
of cognition and designation would be Victor and/or the father, and similarly, 
two narrative patterns could unfold further on. 
In the first case, Victor, the son, i.e. the level of signifiers would uncover 
the level of things, i.e. signifieds by unveiling the conspiracy and proving the 
presence of the father behind it. Accordingly, this would also be the narrative of 
self-knowledge at the same time, resulting in the reconsideration of the position 
in the face of the father. As a consequence of the opposition between father and 
son, the story of some kind of (re)identification process would come to light. It 
would either reinterpret the relation of the signifier and the signified and bring 
about a well functioning new trope (reckoning with the father, the declaration 
of the self as a new meaning) or would reinforce this signification and would 
frame itself into a good metaphor (i.e. Victor would start to lead a life approved 
by his father). In the second case, the interpretative gesture would be 
accomplished by the father, who finally manages to find a well representing son 
for his self-designation due to the alter ego. The story in this case would tell us 
about the self-interpretation of the father, in which the fate of Victor would be to 
disappear in one of its blind spots. 
The story comes up to our expectations to the extent that the alter ego on 
the side of the father really takes over Victor's place (pt. 5), and Victor also 
exposes the role of the father (400-3). However, our expectations are refuted to 
3 "THE TRANSFORMATION OF VICTOR WARD (UH, WE MEAN JOHNSON) [...]" (450). 
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the extent that single moments of the story cannot be explained by this as a 
central conception, and the narrative is not closed either. During his acquitance 
with things, Victor casts light to systems of conspiracy operating below, above, 
and next to each other, involving a whole range of (minimum) double agents. He 
recognizes that Palakon, the father, and Bobby equally and mutually take 
advantage of each other (and him) to achieve their own goals (421-3). Thus, the 
centre gets displaced, but it is inscrutable where. The father cannot be the centre 
because he is controlled as well (by the Japanese, 422), and another, more 
sophisticated conspiracy is being hatched around him. (The Victor alter ego 
keeps on acting in undetected affairs [457-9], the appearance of Lorrie Wallace 
and Palakon on the video record [475].) Bobby cannot be the centre since in 
spite of his death, everything goes on. Palakon cannot be the centre either 
because he " '[...] has... no affinity...' " (422), or rather, even if he did, the 
context implies that he could only be a moved element in the system of the 
conspiracy. 
So, the text introduces more and more conspiracies, double agents, and 
alter egos (Jamie Fields, who—besides Palakon—gives away the most about the 
whole, is one of them as well [424-6]), which makes us reconsider our previous 
notions concerning the scope, the number of the moved elements, and the 
structure of the novel's conspiracy. Such a complex structure is getting outlined 
in front of us in which the different size subsystems (the simoultanously running 
conspiracies) possess partial autonomy, and their elements are intricately 
attached to the elements of other subsystems, making even the status of the 
immobile centres relative. All the same, they do not extinguish each other, the 
resultant of their operations points strictly at one direction: at the father, behind 
the father, at the post of the president, and behind it, at the direction of a global 
political pursuit (mainly on p. 422). (Its nature is unknown, but it is not relevant 
in relation to the structure.) Furthermore, the conspiracies are omnipresent in the 
time and space of the novel's world. (Jamie Fields at the college [467-8]; 
Abdullah's report presumably about the first appearance of the later Victor alter 
ego [11]; the started, but not finished fragments of the narrative in pt. 5 
concerning the Victor alter ego and the pseudo-Lauryn Hynde, showing up 
beside him [460-3], or the already mentioned videotape with Palakon, etc.) 
Every portion of the text's world is produced by the conspiracies; every happe-
ning of it is the result of the pulling of the conspiratorial strings. (Or rather, after 
the novel has introduced alter egos in so great a quantity, presupposing the 
opposite would be more difficult to justify.) However, in this case, we can no 
longer talk about conspiracies—at least not in the sense in which we did 
previously—since they mean reality itself. 
Similarly, the logocentric model of cognition conceives the referential 
world—which it considers to be the most complex organism—as the interaction 
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of more systems of rules, which are subordinate, superordinate, or co-ordinated 
to each other, and which are only partly independent from the other. The 
responsibility for the mapping and exploring of these can be taken by the 
different disciplines, within which particular subsystems (conspiratorial 
subthreads) correspond to particular problem fields of each discipline. Since in 
the text, the conspiracy system gets identified with reality itself, we cannot place 
anything to its end (or to its dominant centre), but the unmoved mover, the 
Father.4 In short, the conspiracy system is the metaphor for Creation and for the 
metaphysical absolute behind it; hence, the analogical structure bears its 
determining features. It is not scrutinizable and not conceivable, but it is present 
in every space and every time; it creates and rules the world with all its 
elements5 and will also destroy it according to its wish.6 What can the text be 
about in this case? 
Against this absolute conspiracy, the stake of cognition is the highest 
possibble. According to our expectations, in the following, the novel is going to 
tell us about how the level of language, signifiers, cognition (Victor) is revealing 
the level of the world, things, signifieds, demonstrating the presence of the only 
fixed point there, the presence of the Father. Thus, the story would again serve 
as the narrative of self-knowledge at the same time, i.e. as the story of a 
(re)identificational process based on the widest perspective possible. The 
presupposition of being the object or the element of the conspiracy, of being a 
creature would provoke the reconsideration of the position in relation to the 
Father. In the first case, Victor would again venture to rewrite this signification 
denying his bond to the ultimate signified. In the second case, by accepting it, he 
would shape himself into a good metaphor putting on the determining features 
of the signified.7 The latter would be the traditional narrative of cognition 
concluded by the Christian West. Its prototype is the prodigal son's story in the 
parables, where the son gets from the lack of knowledge (from false believes), 
through sin, to the perception of Truth, to conversion. 
4 Cf. the theological system of Saint Thomas Aquinas (that phase of the Aristotle 
reception which had the most significant effect on Christian theology) with special 
regard to his "five ways" (Summa Theologiae la, q2, a3). 
5 Cf. "[...] he's erasing people, he's inventing a new world, seamlessy. 'You can move 
planets with this,' Bentley says. 'You can shape lives. The photograph is only the 
beginning.'" (357-8). 
6 Cf. "The extent of the destruction is a blur and its aftermath somehow feels beside the 
point. The point is the bomb itself, its placement, its activation—that's the statement. 
[...] It's really about the will to accomplish this destruction and not about the outcome 
because that's just decoration." (296). 
7 Imitatio Christi; cf. "And that ye put on the new man, which after God is created in 
righteousness and true holiness."(Ephesians 4.24). 
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The text comes up to our expectations to the extent that it suggests the 
frame of this narrative scheme in the form of allusions; however, it also refutes 
them to the extent that it suggests so only in a way as if that scheme was 
unnarratable. The alter ego converts to the principles of the father (446); it 
rereads Dostoyevsky (ibid.); its deeds are explained as repentance by the others 
(455); it functions perfectly as a metaphor; however, it does not tell us about 
what is really going on. On the other side, Victor seems to get (at least regarding 
the volume of the conspiracy) from sheer incompetence to the complete 
understanding of the system.8 He wants to communicate the truth, which he sees 
more and more clearly, with the purpose of saving others;9 he shows the 
development of the intention of help and compassion in himself as new 
characteristics;10 he strives to prevent further destructions;11 by this time he feels 
responsibility for the father (347); he watches himself from an entirely new 
perspective as a sign of the change of his identification;12 he feels regret,13 and 
he shows the feeling of self-accusation (478). Furthermore—after the disorders 
of his short- and long-term memories—as the primary condition of fashioning 
self-identity, he begins to remember, confronting his past and present selves.14 
in short, Victor's transformation follows what has been expected; however, its 
interpretatation (declaration), i.e. true cognition, fails to come about. The 
question remaining after all these is to what extent the language of the fictional 
world can account for this. 
If any meaning can be assumed in this world, it is undoubtedly the 
concept of being "in" (cf. first on p. 5), trendy. If cognition can have any 
objects, they are certainly the celebrities and products in who and in which this 
concept is embodied. If the process of signification can be assumed, it can be 
ensured by the brand and celebrity names, which promise to guarantee the 
8 Especially his conversations with Palakon and Jamie Fields (406-7, 421-6) and finally 
the videotape (475). 
9 He wants to help the French prime minister's son (321-2) and Felix (349-53). 
10 Bentley (416-9), Jamie Fields (421), Chloe (426-30). 
11 Bobby's murder (432-6), a (hopeless) attempt to prevent the explosion of the 
airplane (436-8). 
12 "On the radio: something emblematic of where I'm at this moment, something like 
'Don't Fear the Reaper' or 'I'm a Believer.' " (342) 
13 "How many warnings had I ignored?" (477). 
14"[... ] on that afternoon [... ] a few decisions had to be made [... ] I had to accept this if 
I wanted to get anywhere. [...] I [...] made a promise to myself [...] The future started 
mapping itself out [... ] But [... ] at that point I had no way of understanding one thing: if 
I didn't erase this afternoon from my memory [...], sections of this afternoon would 
come back to me in nightmares. [...] I faded away and my image overlapped and 
dissolved into an image of myself years later [...]" (480-1). Further on: 403,467-8. 
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exclusiveness of meaning even only by the notion of trade mark. This mode of 
signification appears in its clearest form in the specific listings of the register 
at the club opening party. They would represent the most steady parts of the 
text concerning signification and the most compact ones concerning 
meaningfulness.15 
These texts are built up by identical sequences which are in principle 
supposed to represent identical semantical contents (the invited celebrities). It is 
impossible to interpret them referentially because most of them (justly) refers to 
an unknown signified, and how they differ from each other is not specified. 
Since in the text, most of the sequences do not appear twice either (apart from 
the names of the main characters and one or two determinant exceptions), they 
cannot be interpreted inside the fictional world either because they cannot be 
recognised as signs. So, although their difference is given, this only allows each 
sequence to create a unit of empty space equivalent to the others behind itself. 
Though it is clear that not all of the names are unfamiliar (and it is very likely 
that they can all be referencialised), the intertextual signs themselves (known 
from other texts of the referential world) cannot be interpreted either. On the one 
hand, because the sequences referring to known signifieds correlate semantical 
contents which do not belong together,16 and hence the lists can only be 
regarded coherent (Victor surely considers them as such) if—in this context— 
they do not mean what we may relate to them in the referential world. On the 
other hand, provided that meaning formation is the result of the given system of 
differences, the known signs—transferred to a system considerably based on 
equivalency—cannot function in any other way either, just according to the 
same system. Consequently, they can only be interpreted as linguistic elements 
homonymous with particular known proper names, but without known 
meanings. However, since in the language of the novel the rule that difference is 
conceived as identity (and vice versa)17 seems to be quite a general one, even the 
15 The metaphoric of cognition told by Victor when part of the list is being read out: " 
'Yes' [...] 'Fine' [...] 'I am shuddering with pleasure.' [...] 'Somebody needs to hose— 
me—down.' [...] 'Fan-fucking-tastic.' [...] 'Faster.' [...] 'More, more, more—' [...] 
'Oh boy, we're in the hot zone now.' " (70-2). The same in the next chapter from Buddy 
Seagull when Victor is selling the Hurley Thomson gossip to him: " 'Now I'm vaguely 
enthralled.' [...] 'I'm getting a little hot.' [...] 'You're stroking my boner' [...] 'I'mrock 
hard. Continue.' ", etc. (75-6). 
16 ££ "Nike [... ] Beavis and Butt-head [... ] Jeff Koons, Nicole Kidman, Howard Stern 
[...] Huckleberry Finn [...]" (185). 
17 Cf. the utterances with definitive value, e.g. " 'Shit' [...] 'Um, I mean that in a good 
way.' " (8);" 'No, in is out. Out is .in.' " (15);" 'I want something unconsciously classic. 
I want no distinctions between exterior and interior, formal and casual, wet and dry, 
black and white, full and empty [...]' " (51); " 'Jesus, it could apply to anything,' I 
mutter. 'So ultimately it's like meaningless.' " (105). With reference to causality cf. " 
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theoretical assumption of the difference of meaning is questionable. So, this 
pseudo-language does not have any designates. 
After all these, the fact that alter egos and actors are/can be made to 
appear on the scene in such a quantity is hardly suprising. At the same time, by 
the introduction of the filmic levels, another operation emerges in the language 
of the text, which works just in the opposite direction as the one—which may be 
identified as a horizontal merging—mentioned above. (The structure of the film 
levels with the apperance of actors and alter egos as signifiers in the first place 
can also be approached as a semiotic model.) The filmic narratives below each 
other get repeated endlessly. At particular points (where the characters join 
them), they intersect, but never cover each other. As the objects of cognition, 
some figures (subjects) are signifieds on their own. Yet, as actors (alter egos), 
they stand in the position of signifiers; they serve as the signifiers of the played 
characters (roles). Nevertheless, showing this acting from a different 
perspective; moreover, showing this shooting from an even newer perspective, 
the signified (the played character) becomes a signifier (an actor), etc. The 
filmic narratives intersecting each other construct the structural model of 
postponement. The (self-) identities (characters, roles) get differentiated (cf. 
differance); the meanings (scripts) disseminate. Hence, the centre of the 
conspiracy system necessarily disappears in the fabric of the script and film 
levels, which can be comprehended as the metaphor of the postmodern 
(deconstructive) understanding of signification. 
It is as if we had the chance to understand Victor' story as a linear one by 
following the transformation of his relation to this kind of language. This 
narrative is anticipated in the metaphoricality of the following question (NB 
during the journey, ergo unavoidably during the Journey): " 'Really—there's 
fog?' I ask, having assumed that I had been staring at a giant gray wall but 
actually it's a huge window [...]" (215). At the beginning of the story, Victor 
disseminates and merges meanings;18 he does not understand or know 
anything;19 he cannot and does not want to say anything. Contrary to him, the 
characters (lovers, movie makers, agents, etc.) around him possess some kind of 
knowledge and attempt to put it into his mouth (in the form of warnings, 
'[...] in no particular order [...]' " (14 and the same later on pp 66, 139, and 307). 
18 " 'Jesus. As usual, you're so literal-minded.' " (24); " 'Literally or figuratively?' 'Is 
there a difference with you?' she asks. 'How can you be so dense?' " (35);" 'I want some 
kind of answer from you,' she says calmly. 'Don't free-associate. Just tell me why' " 
(176); " 'Did you...understand the question?' [...] 'Maybe you've misunderstood my 
answers.' " (142), etc. 
19" 'I don't know anything, JD. Nothing, nada. Remember that. I... know...nothing. Never 
assume I know anything. Nada Nothing. I know nothing, not a thing. Never—' " (7). 
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cautions, instructions, etc.)20 again and again. Despite the fact that Victor's 
idiocy is obvious for everybody, regarding the signifying rules of the fictional 
world, it is only he who practises language adequately since in this world these 
exact kinds of statements—e.g. "I KNOW WHO YOU ARE AND I KNOW 
WHAT YOU'RE DOING" (105 and from that page till the end)—are 
impossible, even if they are true. However, the virtuosic word-plays and 
misunderstandings/misinterpretations together with Victor's wisdoms are 
abating as the story advances, and by the end of the novel, they give their place 
to a naive, unreflected, meaning-centred usage of language.21 By this time, it is 
Victor who would strive to communicate in possession of a wider knowledge, 
but the addressed ones do not understand him.22 
Victor first problematizes the relation of language and the possibilities of 
cognition directly in the opening lines of the novel. The reading of the "specks"— 
which appear on the "third panel" (accidently right at the beginning of the thirty-
third chapter, in pt. 1), which "look like they were somehow done by a machine" 
(5), and which seem to be "glowing", what is more "spreading" (6)—does not tell 
us more than metafiction tells us any other times, i.e. that only the space of 
language and signification can be taken for granted. Victor's own "story" (i.e. the 
"who, what, where, [and] when" of the story [5]) itself is the process of 
signification. As a subject, he wholly shares the language that this world speaks, 
thus his constant characteristic cannot be anything else, but meaninglessness, 
misunderstanding, self-contradiction, and instability. However, after his metaphor 
(the alter ego) takes over his place in the level of signifiers, and because he 
himself does not have the opportunity to appear on the scene in a new role as a 
signifier,23 his existence (captivity) as the—hypothetic—object of cognition (as a 
signified) becomes inaccessible for the usage of language. The meaning, i.e. the 
direction from which he speaks (the intention of help) and himself, of whom he 
20 " 'No,' he says. 'It's all clear to us.' [...] 'It's only sketchy to you.' " (165); " 'See, 
Victor, the problem is you've got to know things,' she says. 'But you don't.' " (173); " 
'Everything you know is wrong.' " (176); " 'It's what you don't know that matters most 
[...]' " (283), etc. 
21 Cf. " 'At first I was confused by what passed for love in this world: people discarded 
because they were too old or too fat ot too poor [...], they weren't hip, they weren't 
remotely famous. This was how you chose lovers. This was what decided friends. [...] 
On the verge of tears—because I was dealing with the fact that we lived in a world 
where beauty was considered an accomplishment—I turned away [...]' " (480-1), or cf. 
the sentence quoted under footnoote 12. 
22 The son of the French prime minister and Felix (footnote 9), the sister (468-9, 476), 
the evoking and reinterpretation of the sentence "7 know who you are and I know what 
you 're doing" by him at this time (437). 
23 " 'Your role is over, Victor,' " says the director of (one of?) the French crew(s) (471). 
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wants to give news (the telephone calls to his sister) are profound secrets, and both 
remain unuttered and unutterable. By the end of the novel, Victor's and his 
company's usage of language, following the change-over of the alter egos,24 
occupies a chiastic opposition in relation to each other. 
He reflects on this in the closing chapter while he is most likely to be shot 
in the back of the neck25 by that certain Uzi which has been loaded earlier, in pt. 6, 
ch. 13, precisely when the reality and the unfathomability of the conspiracy gain 
final proof. The mountain is always a probable scene for forming connection with 
the sacral. Life flows in the valley, on the fields, on the highways just like in the 
picture. The mountain is unknown, a secret,26 and at its feet lies language itself: 
the "villagers [...] celebrating in a field of long grass" on the hither side and the 
"highway" lined with "billboards" on the farther side, behind the mountain. 
"The stars are real." If I understand it literally, Victor talks about some 
figures of the picture. If he means celebrities, he says a figure of speech. It is 
only representation that is real. 
"The future is that mountain." In this sense the metaphoric mountain is 
either unreachable, or one can only saunter off from it to the highway, back to 
the territory of language. The questions and the promises of the answers are 
there somewhere, "[at] any point beyond [the mountain]". 
To sum up, the alter ego signifies something, but not what is really there. 
Falling out from the signifying process, Victor remains unuttered. It is only 
substitution that is real; what is really there, cannot be worded. 
The text represents the concepts of language and cognition as both the 
postmodern and the metaphysics of presence conceive them by the trope system 
of a complex metaphoric allegory based on structural analogy. The annihilation 
of reality (the explosions, the murders, etc.), the apocalyptic narrative itself stem 
from the inner, metaphoric logic of allegorization, and in the reading of the 
novel it is conceived as the ground state of Creation. 
Certain motifs of the text obviously offer themselves for this approach. (As 
a matter of fact, sometimes with even too suspicious an obviousness.) The smell 
of shit and flies: the collateral accessories of decay. Cold, hoar, ice: they are all 
associated with distance, isolation, atomization. Teutonic cross and pentagrams at 
24 As the file names prove, by that time—expectedly—both the father and the sister 
are alter egos (358). 
25 Watching the "mural", he says, "I'm falling forward but also moving up toward the 
mountain [...]" (482, italics mine). Earlier: " 'Someone is going to extract you from this 
sooner or later,' the director says."—ambiguously, specially as a few lines later he 
presumably apostrophes the same person as a war criminal (471). 
26 "The question about the hat will never be asked. The question about the hat is a 
big black mountain and the room is a trap. " (341). 
106 
the beginning and the ending of the novel (16, 415-6): the symbols of apocalyptic 
ideas. Confetti: occupying, covering up, legitimizing something. Victor's alter ego 
as the "wolf in a lamb's clothing" (cf. Matthew 7.15 and Revelations 13.11-2) is 
the anticipation of the antichrist.27 However, instead of the horsemen of the 
apocalypse, we persistently come across the Japanese and rugby-player hippies 
taking their Pekineses for a walk. 
The numbering of the different sections of the text in this approach can be 
interpreted as follows. The numbering of the parts—which starts and increases 
from one (1)—would be the apocalyptic narrative itself, inside which perpetual 
destruction and the reaching of the endpoint is taking place. This is an onward, 
never-ending count-down. Thus, the chapters would mean the chain of the 
moments of devastation, the gradual narrowing down (of the opportunities and 
the scope of motion), the falling back, the annihilation. Nevertheless, these two 
numberings are not simply the opposites of each other. So far as the chapters 
within a part always arrive at zero (0), the apocalyptic narrative can only count 
with something already existing, i.e. with Creation, with the one (1) since it 
exists from the beginning. The last chapter joins the two numberings; in it the 
numbering of the chapters is already increasing, but from zero (0). The final 
annihilation (0) as the condition of the advancement of the apocalyptic narrative 
is here already running parallel with the forward movement. 
The interpretation of the mottos28 can be the following. The sentence 
attributed to Krishna is a revelation signed as coming from God and states the 
meaning of the ultimate substance, an identical meaning (you, I, these) being 
present behind and in everything. This utterance reveals and attempts to make us 
see29 a knowledge which is beyond the interrelations (language, causality) the 
secular world can see. In the extract ascribed to Hitler, Hitler provides the 
27 « 'Don't f e a r the reaper, Victor,' Deepak says [...] 'I am the fucking reaper, 
Deepak,' [...]" (445-6). (Cf. footnote 12.) 
28 "There was no time when you nor I nor these kings did not exist.—Krishna. You make 
mistake if you see what we do as merely political.—Hitler" 
29 In spite of the fact that this text structurally resembles to the "out-is-in"-like parts of 
the novel and in its meaning to the appearance of alter egos, from this point of view the 
East can be set in paralell both with the postmodern concept of language (regarding its 
conception about the signifying process) and with the metaphyisics of presence 
(regarding its conclusion). (Every difference is the result of the deceptive operation of 
consciousness and language; in fact everything is The Same; none of them is That.) This 
conception occurs only once in the novel, but at a distinguished point. In pt. 5, when we 
confront with the unnarratibility of the narrative of cognition, the Indian guru, Deepak 
makes a similar statement to Victor's alter ego: " 'You see that bench?' [...] 'It's also 
you,' [...] 'You, Victor, are also that bench.' " (445). The invoking of the East in this 
case seems to open the door to the blending of the logocentric and the postmodern 
concepts of language. 
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indirect interpretation of his and his supporters' deeds as an alternative for a 
different interpretation. What these deeds would exactly be is not known, but on 
the one hand, in case they can be confused with politics—because though they 
are not „merely" political, they obviously bear that quality as well—they are 
necessarily acts (a text) which own(s) an unfixed centre and have (has) no 
inherent meaning. On the other hand, these deeds evoke apparently apocalyptic 
notions. The first motto, disrupting the linguistic and causal relations, points 
from the sacral towards man. The second points from man, through language, to 
the desacralized world. The first states the existence of meaning and faces us 
with the impossibility of a linguistic-causal cognition. The second implies a 
meaning which is in continuous motion and gives its linguistic-causal-natured 
interpretation. 
The two texts occupy the same chiastic opposition in relation to each 
other as Victor and his alter ego do. If we treat the opposition as a question, this 
question refers exactly to the most important moments of the novel: to the 
exsistence or the lack of meaning, to the possibility or impossibility of 
cognition, to the role of language within that, and to the sacral references of 
these; i.e. to the rereading of the postmodern discourse of cognition—itself 
rereading the metaphysics of presence—which, in my aproach, is finally the 
central problem of the novel. 
I think that the main concern of Glamorama is not the nature of textual 
operations, but the nature of reality, which the novel conceives as a text in the 
widest sense. Principally, the work is not interested in the theoretical problems 
of signification, but in the practice of signification and interpretation proceeding 
in the referential world. It regards the whole postmodern discourse (particularly 
deconstruction) as a tradition having been read into topi, and thinking over 
tradition taken in this sense, it creates its own patent absurdity. It re-evaluates 
the most productive theoretical commonplaces by inserting them into a structure 
which can be understood as some kind of synthesis of the inseminative and 
disseminative text models. It does not presume an accessible ultimate signified, 
but it considers certain pseudo-meanings to be inherent. It treats the 
impossibility of referential representation as an evidence; nevertheless, it seems 
to conceive itself as a mirror capable of showing reality in its totality. And what 
can be gathered from this mirror is above all not some kind of (trifling) 
metaphysical moral, but the existence of this complex (combined) textual 
pattern itself as the primary principle underlying cultural motions. 
Translated by Zsuzsa Maczak 
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